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Pearlman: Assistance of Counsel

NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT
l

People v. Veray
(published August 12, 2002)
On June 15, 1993, Teddy Veray was arrested and charged
with violating New York Penal Law Sections 220.16(1)2 and
220.09(1).' Eight days later, Veray pleaded guilty to criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and was
sentenced to five years probation.4 Subsequently, Veray moved to
withdraw his guilty plea based on the constitutional safeguards set
forth in both the Federal 5 and New York State 6 Constitutions
regarding effective assistance of counsel. Veray presented a
twofold argument as to why the court should vacate his conviction
and remand the case for trial. Veray contended that his legal
representative failed to safeguard his interests by not contesting the
manner in which the police seized his property.7 Veray's second
argument was that his counsel failed to advise him of the
ramifications of a guilty plea; specifically he argued the denial of
"the right to a competent attorney and a vigorous defense." 8 At a
subsequent hearing, the New York City Criminal Court denied
Veray's motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the conviction, on
'N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at 20, col. 6 (N.Y.Cty. Crim. Ct.).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16(1) (McKinney 1999) provides: "A personis
guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree when
he knowingly and unlawfully possesses: a narcotic drug with intent to sell it."
3N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.09(1) (McKinney 1999) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fourth degree when he knowingly and
unlawfully possesses: one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures or substances containing a narcotic drug and said
preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an
aggregate weight of one-eighth ounce or more.
4 Veray, supra note 1.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in pertinent part: "[A]nd to have
the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6 states in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him. . .
7 Veray, supra note I.
8

Veray, supra note 1.
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the ground that the ineffective counsel argument was unfounded. 9
In reaching this conclusion, that court stated, "[t]he defendant
failed to make any showing that his attorney's decision not to
contest the search rose to the level of ineffective assistance of
counsel." 10 On July 23, 1993, the court set forth in detail the
ramifications of the guilty plea to the defendant. 1 For example,
the court explained that if Veray pleaded guilty to the charge of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree,
he would waive his fundamental due process rights guaranteed
under both the New York State and Federal Constitutions.' 2 These
rights included, among others, the right to a jury trial, the right to
testify on his own behalf, and the right to challenge the manner in
which the police officer seized his property.
The Veray court began its analysis by discussing People v.
Baldi,13 which set forth the New York standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Baldi court held that "so long as the
evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case,
viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal
that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the
constitutional requirement will have been met."' 14 In Baldi, the
defendant was convicted in two separate trials. 15 In the first trial,
Baldi was convicted of attempted murder, burglary in the second
degree, and felonious possession of weapons.' 6 Two months later,
9 Veray, supra note 1

1o Veray, supra note 1.
11Veray, supra note 1. The New York City Criminal Court accepted Veray's
guilty plea for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.
12Veray, supra note 1. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI and N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6.
'" 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981).
14 Id. at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
"sId. at 140, 429 N.E.2d at 401, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
16Id. at 141, 429 N.E.2d at 401-02, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 895. In Baldi, police
responded to a prowler complaint, and came upon Baldi in the vicinity of the
call. Id. Upon asking for identification, Baldi produced a pistol and fired one
time at the chest of the responding officer. The gun failed to discharge and
Baldi was subsequently searched and arrested. Id. at 141, 429 N.E.2d at 402,
444 N.Y.S.2d at 895. The search revealed live ammunition and personal items
from the woman that made the initial call to police. Id. Baldi later denied the
burglary and stated that he found the items on the street. Baldi, was later
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Baldi was convicted of murder in the second degree. 17 Baldi
appealed his conviction arguing that throughout both trials, his
attorney's conduct denied him effective assistance of counsel. 18
Specifically, Sparrow, Baldi's attorney, opted for the defense of19
not guilty by reason of insanity, rather then factual innocence.
To help prove the insanity claim, Sparrow testified that he
observed Baldi both during his initial interview and when he
visited Baldi at the psychiatric hospital. 20 Baldi claimed that it was
inappropriate for Sparrow to testify, and that claim served as a
basis for appeal. 2 1 Additionally, Baldi contended that Sparrow's
examination of expert witnesses also was ineffective. 22 Baldi
further claimed that Sparrow's involvement in two police
interrogations, and the poor quality of his effort to suppress a
confession, were further evidence of ineffective counsel.23
The court analyzed each of Baldi's contentions to
determine if he had received meaningful representation. 24 In
regard to the first contention, the court answered in the negative.
Specifically, the court found that Sparrow employed a viable
defense, insanity, which was bolstered by the fact that his client

indicted on multiple related charges, but found to be incompetent to stand trial.
Id.
"7Id. at 141-43, 429 N.E.2d at 402-03, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 895. The charge of
murder in the second degree stemed from events that took place after Baldi's
release from Creedmoor State Hospital. Four months after Baldi's release, a
fifteen year-old girl was stabbed to death while sleeping in her bedroom. New
York City Police came upon Baldi while conducting a post-incident
investigation that involved "staking-out" the neighborhood of the murder.
Subsequent investigation involved the police searching and removing knives and
sexually- explicit material from Baldi's apartment. Later that day, Baldi was
escorted to the police station where he entered a trance-like state and acted-out
the killing of the fifteen year-old girl. Baldi acted out the killing two more times
at the police station and once at the home of the child victim before he was taken
back to the station and charged her murder. Id.
18Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 145, 429 N.E.2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
'9 1d. at 143, 429 N.E.2d at 403, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
20 Id. at 143-44, 429 N.E.2d at 403, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
2 Id. at 143-44, 429 N.E.2d at 402-03, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
22 Id. at 144, 429 N.E.2d at 403-04, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
23 Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
24 Id. at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
25 id.
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was found incompetent to stand trial when first arrested.26
Additionally, the court held that Sparrow used the factual defense
of innocence when he pointed out the weakness in the People's
case. 27 Furthermore, the court found that Sparrow had examined
the expert witnesses in depth during cross-examination but was
simply unable to establish any contradictory testimony that would
help the defense. 28 Similarly, the court found Sparrow's testimony
during the trial strengthened Baldi's defense. 29 By testifying,
Sparrow was able to introduce evidence of Baldi's previous
morally reprehensible crimes, such as sexual assaults, which
The court also noted that
furthered his insanity defense. 30
Sparrow's participation during the interrogations and his efforts to
suppress the statements made during the interrogations did not pass
the threshold of ineffective counsel. 31 Eerily foreshadowing the
future federal outcome determinative test, 32 the court found that
Sparrow's inability to secure a written agreement from the
Assistant District Attorney, ensuring Baldi's statements would not
be used against him, might have raised a question of
ineffectiveness. 33 The issue was later deemed moot because the
statements were subsequently suppressed, and therefore had no
bearing on the outcome of the case.
Baldi's next contention was that Sparrow's testimony
regarding Baldi's apparent mental condition was ground for
reversal because the testimony hindered his defense. The court
expressly rejected this theory, finding that Sparrow would have
violated the ethics code if he did not testify. 35 The court added that
Baldi's final claim of ineffective counsel, the alleged failure to
illicit testimony from expert witnesses, was invalid because
26 Id. at 141, 429 N.E.2d at 402, 444 N.Y.S.2d
27 Id. at 148, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d
28 Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 148, 429 N.E.2d at 406,
29 Id. at 148, 429 N.E.2d at 406, 444 N.Y.S.2d
30 Id. at 148, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d

at 893.
at 898.
444 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
at 898.
at 898.

3' Id. at 150, 429 N.E.2d at 407, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
32 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that ineffective
assistance of counsel will not be found where the contended errors did not lead
to a prejudiced result).
33 Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d. at 149, 429 N.E.2d at 406, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
iId. at 149, 429 N.E.2d at 406, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
IId. at 150, 429 N.E.2d at 407, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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Sparrow's decision was merely an unsuccessful trial tactic, which
does not automatically create a reversible error. 36 The court added
that Sparrow had used a known defense and his cumulative
37
knowledge to produce a vigorous and competent defense.
Unfortunately, Sparrow's defense was unsuccessful and the court
held that mere failure to win 38at trial does not automatically deem
the representation ineffective.
In the instant case, the New York City Criminal Court was
not persuaded by Veray's arguments. The court found that Veray
was given "meaningful representation" under the Baldi standard. 9
The court found that Veray failed to meet the burden set forth in
People v. Rivera,4° primarily because Veray was unable to
demonstrate that his attorney's decisions were not well thoughtout, planned choices, and were not part of a greater defense
strategy. 41 It appeared the court was offended by the proposition
that counsel failed to give meaningful representation, given that
defendant received such a disproportionate sentence.42 Veray was
facing the possibility of serving twenty-five years in prison,
however, his attorney was able to secure the minimum sentence of
five years probation. Veray further argued that his representation
was ineffective because counsel failed to explain the effect of his
guilty plea on the federal sentencing guidelines, and other nuances
36

Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.

" Id. at 151, 429 N.E.2d at 407, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01.
38 Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
39 Veray, supra note 1.
40 See People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 709, 525 N.E.2d 688, 700, 530
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1988). In Rivera, the defendant was convicted of felony
murder and sentenced to prison for twenty years to life. Rivera argued that his
attorney failed to move for the suppression of statements in front of police after
he had asked for representation and then was told by police "it would take too
long and only make matters worse." Id. In the consolidated case of People v.
Montana, the defendant alleged that he was denied effective representation of
counsel because his attorney failed to move to suppress physical evidence and
statements following an illegal stop. The court discussed the likelihood of
alternative reasons for defendant's counsel to fail to make certain pretrial
motions, and held that absent such a showing the court would presume counsel's
representation was effective. Id.
41 Veray, supra note 1.
42 Veray, supra note 1 ("To say that defense counsel's conduct lacked
'strategic or other legitimate explanation' in not pursuing the hearing is difficult
to fathom....").
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of his decision to plead guilty. 43 The court found this position
equally untenable because the record was wholly devoid of any
evidence to support that proposition." The court relied on the
New York Court of Appeals case of People v. Francis,45 and held
that the court was under no obligation to ascertain whether the
defendant understood the ramifications of his plea, 46 but
nevertheless explained the rights that Veray would be forfeiting by
admitting his guilt.47 Veray's other claims of ineffective counsel
48
were wholly rejected by the court as unsupportable.
In 1995, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v.
Ford.4 9 The court decided that failure of an attorney to wam of
collateral consequences, such as deportation proceedings following
a criminal conviction or plea arrangement, does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. 50 Relying on the Baldi standard,
43

Veray, supra note 1.

44 Veray, supra note 1.
4' 38 N.Y.2d 150, 341 N.E.2d 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1975).

In Francis, the
defendant was arrested for carrying a gun and ammunition at his job in the post
office at Kennedy Airport. The law under which he was charged makes
possession of a gun and ammunition a D felony unless the possession occurs in a
person's home or place of business, in which case the offense is a misdeamnor.
At the time, the term "place of business" had not been definitely defined.
Francis contended, for the first time on appeal, that the judge had an absolute
duty to warn him that he might qualify for the misdemeanor charge. Id. at 152.
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument, holding that there is no
requirement that the Judge conduct a pro formna inquisition in each case on the
off chance that the defendant who is adequately represented by counsel and who
admits to the underlying facts, may nevertheless not know what he is doing. Id.
at 155, 341 N.E.2d at 544, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
46 Veray, supra note
1.
47 Veray, supra note 1.
48 Veray, supra note 1 (rejecting defendant's claim that he was
coerced to
accept the guilty plea as a result of being threatened with the possibility of
indictment, because the record was devoid of sufficient facts).
49 86 N.Y.2d 397, 657 N.E.2d 265, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270
(1995).
'0 Id. at 403-04, 657 N.E.2d at 267-68, 633 N.Y.S.2d 272-73. In Ford,relying
on the advice of counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, following an
accidental discharge of a firearm that killed his girlfriend. After the defendant
served the minimum sentence and was released, the Immigration and
Nationalization Service began deportation proceedings. Ford was a documented
legal alien from Jamaica. Ford alleged that his attorney failed to warn him of
the possibility of deportation and therefore furnished ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 402, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
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the Court of APeals decided that Ford had received meaningful
representation.
Ford was facing the possibility of serving
concurrent sentences for manslaughter and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree, equaling a 30-year jail sentence.
However, his counsel was able to limit the sentence to two to six
years. Additionally, the court stated that failure to advise Ford of
the possibility of collateral consequences does not manifestly
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided
Strickland v. Washington, which set the federal standard for
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.53 The Court
set forth a two-prong test for evaluating claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, a defendant must show that the
representation received from the attorney was "deficient," meaning
that counsel was not functioning as "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant under the Sixth Amendment. 54 The Court added that the
Sixth Amendment does not rely upon a set of explicit instructions,
but rather the legal profession's own standards for determining the
particular requirements of effective counsel.
The second prong
of the test mandates that the defendant must show that he was
actually prejudiced. 6 The Court explained that the defendant's
lawyer must have made "errors so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 57 There
must be a "reasonable probability" that if not for the errors of
58
defendant's counsel, the result would have been different.
Following Strickland, the Supreme Court decided Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 9 where the Court elaborated on what constitutes
prejudice when applying the first prong of the Strickland test. The
Court held that overall fairness must be taken into consideration

Id. at 404, 657 N.E.2d at 268, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
402, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
13 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
14 id. at 687.
" Id. at 688.
52 id. at

16

Id. at 687.

57 id.

58Strickland,466 U.S. at 694.
'9 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
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when analyzing a federal case for ineffective assistance of
counsel.6 °
The New York standard for deciding when representation is
deemed ineffective allows for broad review by a court in gauging
the effectiveness of representation by looking at all the relevant
factors, using a totality of the circumstances as the yardstick to
measure the meaningfulness of the representation. The Baldi court
articulated that "so long as the evidence, the law, and the
circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the
time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided
meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have
been met.'
Conversely, federal courts employ a stricter standard which
analyzes the possible deficient representation and the outcome
thereafter, coupled with the principle of fairness to maintain the
integrity of the underlying guiding foundation. To recapitulate, the
current test for federal constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel requires a showing that the attorney's performance was
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant.
However, even if counsel's performance was deficient and
prejudicial, the claim of ineffective assistance will not prevail if
the outcome comports with fundamental fairness.

Randy S. Pearlman

60 Id. at 372.
6' Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
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